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Mutual funds have, in the past two decades, "become one
of the most popular investment mediums, especially for the
small investor. Mutual funds have "been the most rapidly
growing segment of the financial intermediaries and this dra-
matic growth, continuing even today, has resulted in mutual
funds becoming an investment medium of significance. Be-
cause of this p^rowth, much attention has been drawn to the
adequacy of government regulations and the degree of investor
protection provided mutual fund Investors. There exists an
extensive body of laws regulating the securities industry in
general and the invesment companies in particular.^ Several
studies have been conducted to identify the major problems
and regulation deficiencies surrounding the mutual fund in-
dustry. 1'' Despite the statutory regulation presently applied
to the mutual fund industry, there has always been a nagging,
reoccurring doubt surrounding the adequacy of the regulatory
measures applying to the management companies and management
advisors who operate the many mutual funds. While no ra-
1 See Chapter II, inlDL-
"See Chapter 1I 3 infra.
3See Chapter III, infra

2tlonal investor could expect protection against loss of capi-
tal as a result of market fluctuation, it is rational to expect
maximum protection from fraud, "bad faith, willful misfeasance,
gross negligence, or reckless disregard by the managment
organization in the performance of their obligations and
duties. It is this area of management actions that is the
subject of this Thesis.
Stateraen t^o f Prob 1 em
The expansion of the mutual fund industry during the
past two decades has occurred in both the number of share-
holders and in the net asset value of the funds. This great
Investor interest has precipitated the formation of several
new mutual funds and a resultant increase in the number of
personnel and organizations managing the mutual funds and
their assets. When so many people are involved with respon-
sibility for so large a concentration of investment funds,
the question of adequate regulation and control of the in-
dustry is constantly being reexamined. The purpose of this
research project is to determine if present Federal regula-
tion of mutual fund management advisor groups is adequate
for investor protection from fraud and general gross mis-
management of factors other than loss of principal.
The basic research question of this study is: Is pre-
Wi e s enb erger Servi c e s , Inc . , Inv^ st^ent Companie s
IP 70, (New York: WIesenberger Services, Inc., 1970 J, p. IS.

3sent Federal regulation of mutual fund management companies
adequate for investor protection? This basic question sug-
gests several subsidiary questions:
1. What has been the history of open-ended investment company
regulation?
2. What are the current issues relating to mutual fund
management company regulation?
3. How effective are existing regulatory measures that apply
to managers of open-ended investment companies?
4. Do existing regulatory measures adequately protect in-
vestors?
5. Is there a need for additional regulation?
Scope of the Study
This research study will be directed primarily toward
identity and analysis of existing regulatory measures appli-
cable to management companies and investment advisors asso-
ciated with mutual funds. The primary objective is to deter-
mine if the present body of Federal regulatory statutes pro-
vides reasonably adequate investor protection. The study will
consider only those companies which are actively operating,
managing, or providing investment advisory service to mutual
funds. Mutual funds are more accurately labeled open-ended
investment companies; however, within this report the terms
mutual fund, open-ended investment company, and investment
company will be used interchangeably. •* The research study
-It is assumed that a Lnition and explanation of

4will identify and review existing regulatory statutes, isolate
applicable provisions that apply to regulation of mutual fund
management companies, analyze the effectiveness and adequacy
of the existing lav/, and determine if additional regulation
of management companies is necessary in order to provide ade-
quate investor protection. The research effort is directed
toward measuring the adequacy of Federal regulations in pro-
viding shareholder protection from fraud, willful misfeasance,
bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard by the
management companies in their obligations and duties. The
term gross mismanagement will be used as an all inclusive
term for the management action under examination.
It is hoped that an analysis of the effectiveness of
existing mutual fund management company regulation will afford
an adequate basis for determination of what additional mea-
sures, if indeed there are any, are necessary in order that
the individual mutual fund shareholder may be reasonably and
adequately protected from fraud and gross misfeasance. This
study is timely in the respect that the Congress passed into
law the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970. This act
amended the basic mutual fund regulatory statue, viz., the
these terms is unnecessary for readers of this thesis. For
further information on investment companies, their organiza-
tion, operations, and structure, see Investment Companies
1970
^ by Wiesenberger Services, Inc., Ke\\ Stork.
1 Investment Company Amendments Act of 19 70. 84 Stat.
1413 (1970).

Federal Investment Company Act of 1940. It is timely and
appropriate, .therefore, to review the situation in light of
the newly amended lav; and determine if the Federal "body of
regulatory law is adequate as it pertains to management com-
panies of mutual funds.
The study is limited in that it considers only the Fed-
eral sector of regulation and disregards, for the most part,
the role of State statutes. Further, the study analyzes only
that part of the regulation system that applies to management
companies. It is further limited in scope to only those man-
agement companies that are associated with open-ended invest-
ment companies. Therefore, it is not intended that statements
contained in this research study be applicable to all regula-
tory issues or all investment companies. It should also be
noted that this study does not consider the items of investor
protection from the loss of capital or the "performance" of
mutual fund management companies.
Methodology of Study
Information and data for this study was derived from
secondary sources including SEC studies, Independent studies,
Senate and House reports, and contemporary books written about
the mutual fund Industry. Other sources were textbooks, arti-
cles, financial newspapers, Industry reports, and Investment
1Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 769 (1940
)
15 U.'S.C. Sess. 80(2)~1 to -52 (1964).

6company letters., publications, and financial reports. The
information was obtained from the Geroge Washington Uni-
versity library, the Fairfax County library, the Library
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Public
Doc. t Rooms of the United States Congress. The analysis
in the report is primarily deductive.
Organization of the Study
Entitled "Some Implications of the Adequacy of Mutual
Fund Regulation, " this research report contains, in Chapter
II, a listing of mutual fund development and traces the evo-
lution and development of investment company regulation in
the United States. Chapter III reviews the past studies and
identifies the current issues concerned with determining the
adequacy of present regulatory measures. Chapter IV analyses
the effectiveness and adequacy of current regulation as well
as the unresolved current issues and their relationship to
existing regulatory laws. A summary and conclusions are
presented in Chapter V.

CHAPTER II
HISTORY OP MUTUAL FUND DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION
What is a mutual fund? The phrase "mutual fund" Is a
somewhat colloquial term for what, technically and more
descriptively, is an open-ended investment company. As
stated in Chapter I, these two terms will be used inter-
chang ably herein. Nothing could be simpler than the basic
Idea of an investment company. It is a corporation whose
only business is the proper investment of its shareholders'
money. These assets are normally invested in common stocks
or a combination of equities and bonds, in the hope of achiev-
ing a specific investment goal. A mutual fund brings together
the investment funds of many people with similar needs and
purposes, and undertakes to do a better job of investing these
funds and managing the investments than individuals could do
for themselves.
Mutual funds are limited by law to only offering one
class of shares. A mutual fund's share total fluctuates from
day to day because, in most cases, the fund is constantly cre-
ating new shares for investors who wish to purchase them, and
In all cases is ready to buy back shares already In existence
at whatever specific amount they are worth at the time. In
other .ores, a mutual fund's capitalization is "open" at least
on one end and generally is open at both ends. Mutual fund
shares arc traded over the counter by de< rs and brokers
7

who arc compensated by the fund management for their cervices.
Although numerous distinctions are necessary for a complete
understanding of all that investment companies and mutual
funds offer, the purpose of this research is not to describe
the structure of the industry, but rather to investigate
the adequacy of Federal regulations of the management com-
panies employed by the mutual fund organizations. Return-
ing to the first subsidiary question, an examination of the
history of mutual funds and their growth in the United States
is appropriate.
History o f Mutual Funds and Their Growth in the United States
While many modern business innovations have originated
in the United States, Eurc was the birthplace of investment
companies. The origin, it is generally agreed, can be traced
to the Societe General e de Belgique, formed in 1822 by King
William I of Belgium. However, the major development of in-
vestment companies took place in England, beginning in 1868
with the formation of the Foreign and Colonial Government
Trust in London. This trust had as its purpose the diminish-
ing or diversifying of risk in the purchase of foreign and
'For further info: ' on concerning investment com-
panies, their organization, purpose, and operation, the first
section of Inv e
s
tment Co: Les, 1970 is recommended. Invest-
ment ' es is lished oy Arthur Wiesenberger Services,
, Bullock, Th e Story of investment Companies (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. I.

9colonial government securities, engaged in other financing
or banking activities, and can be said--insofar as research
indicates- -to be the true pioneer of investment companies.-^
The early British trusts were conservative, emphasized in-
come, and practiced wide diversification. Most purchased
commonwealth and foreign government securities while issuing
stock similar to what is known today as common, preferred,
and debenture bonds.- During this period, a bookkeeper,
Robert Fleming, In Dundee, Scotland, became interested in
investment opportunities in the post-Civil War United States
Mr. Fleming's enthusiasm resulted in the formation of a new
investment company, in 1873, and the beginning of a long
and distinguished association with the investment company
industry of which he will always be called the father.
The first American experience with investment trusts
probably occurred in the mid-1800' sj however, the ventures
were small and have been lost in the haze of the years. The
oldest investment company in the United States still in ex-
istence is the Boston Personal Property Trust, organized in
Boston in 1893. ^ Development of investment companies was
-'Ibid., p. 2.
2Elvin F. Donaldson and John K. Pfahl, Corporate Fi-
nance , 2nd ed., (New York: The Ronald Press Company^ 196.9,)
,
p. 680.
"'Bullock, Story r>:n Investment Companies
, pp. 5-8.
4 Ib:-d., p. 15.
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slow during the next tv/o decades. Not until the mid- and
late-1920's did investment company formation "begin in earn-
est. Li*ch, 1924 saw the "birth of the first open-ended in-
vestment company, or mutual fund, in this country with the
formation of Massachusetts Investors Trust in Boston.
While MIT has survived the years and been a credit to the
industry, many of the other investment companies formed in
the late lS20's were not as fortunate. The market crash of
1929 brought the expansion of investment companies to an
abrupt halt.. The ensuing depression saw many of the invest-
ment companies fail and others consolidated into larger units
after being bought up for relatively low prices. Following
the depression, which saw the soundly conceived and well
manage d investment companies survive in moderately good
shape, a slight resurgence of investment companies occurred;
however, expansion was very modest until after' the end of
World War II. One individual who survived the depression to
go on toward pioneering the open-ended investment company
industry in the United States was Calvin Bullock. 2 Probably
more than any other individual Mr. Bullock was the major
factor in developing the mutual fund industry in the United
States.
There were only nineteen open-ended investment com-
1 Ibid
. 3 pp. 21-23.
2 Ibid., r^- 23-24
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panics with total assets of around $140 million at the end of
1929. This figure decreased during the depression years,
but by 1940 the industry had recovered to where assets totaled
$448 million. The decade of the 40 ' s saw the beginning of
rapid mutual fund growth. By 1950 there were approximately
100 registered companies with combined assets of $2.5
billion. 3 The development and growth of mutual funds since
1950 is reflected by the data in Table I.
TABLE 1
Growth of Investment Company Assets Since 1950












SOURCE: Investment Company Institute, 1971 Mutual Fund Fact




Wiesenberger Services, Inc., Investment Companies 1970
(New York: Wiesenberger Services, Inc., 197071 p. 3 -
5 Ibid, pp. 13 and 18.
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There were, in 1970, over 517 registered open-ended
Investment companies operating in the United States. This
represents a 417 percent increase during the twenty-year
period from 1950 to the end of 1969. Asset values rose from
$2.5 billion in 1950 to $47.6 billion at the end of 1970,
or over 1,600 percent. The present size and types of mutual
funds are reflected in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Classification of Mutual Funds by Size and Type
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Number Assets % of
Size of Fund of Funds (000 omitted) Total
Common Stock:
Maximum Capital Gain 180 $ 6,304,600 15,8
Growth 136 17,234,700 32.8
Growth and Income 80 16,514,400 31.4
Special i zed 20 5,600 0.6
Balanced 30 6,484.000 12.3
Inc> 34 2,139,900 4.1
Tax- Free Exchange 29 1,325,500 2-5
Bond and Preferred Stock 9 282,600 0.5
Total 51 $52,621,400 100.0
SOURCE: Wiesenbergor Services, Inc., Inves tment Companies 1970
(Nov; York: Wiesenberger Services, Inc., ' }, p. 44
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Another indication of the growing acceptance of mutual
funds by the investing public is shown in Table 3 which de-
picts the growing number of shareholder accounts over the
past twenty years. While some investors will establish ac-
counts in more than one fund, the data in Table 3 does show
over a tenfold increase in shareholder accounts and it seems
logical to assume that a large measure of this growth repre-
sents new mutual fund investors.
TABLE 3
Increase in Number of Shareholder Accounts Since 1950












SOURCE : Wi e s enb erger Services, Inc . , Investment Companies 1970
(New York: Wlesenberger Services, Trie
.
, 1970), p. HT"
for years 1950-1963. " Data for 1970 from Investment
Company Institute, Washington, D. C.
The data contained in Tables 1 and 3 illustrates that
the growth of the mutual fund industry over the past twenty
years has been large and rapid. This observation is rein-
forced by the fact that mutual fund growth has far surpassed
the growth of other financial intermediaries. Only credit
unions have been able to approach the twentyfold growth rate
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of mutual funds for the past twenty years.
The effect of a. rapidly expanding mutual fund Industry
on the savings and investment practices of individuals as
well as the securities markets has been pronounced. The
rapid growth rate along with the magnitude of the capital
involved have raised serious questions concerning the degree
of government regulations necessary to provide proper pro-
tection for the investment public. The concern centered
around protecting the Investing public, particularly the
small investor, has given rise to many of the present regu-
latory statutes. Further, it is the same concern which is
the root of the research question under examination herein.
Evolution of Investment Company Regulation
Because the regulation of investment companies is
inseparably tied with that for the securities industry as a
whole In the United States, this section will outline the
evolution of regulations for the whole securities industry
with special emphasis being placed on those regulatory func-
tions applying to investment companies.
Regulation of investment processes and security deal-
ing was almost nonexistent prior to 1930. What few regula-
tions existed were contained in state laws which varied widely
and, while applying to Investment companies, did not refer
Pitt Lee Murry, "Mutual Fund Reform: Will Further
ulation be Necessary for Investor Protection by 1975?,"




to them by name. Research indicates the first regulatory
effort to deal with investment companies per se was in 1927
when the Attorney General of the state of New York conducted
an investigation that culminated in draft legislation pro-
posing regulation of the then predominant investment trusts.
The proposed bill, after many changes in point of view,
passed the state Senate, but failed of passage in the As-
1
sembly. Other states did pass legislation dealing with in-
vestment companies; however, the attitude toward trusts, as
investment companies were then known, was very inconsistent.
The same practice commended in one state was frowned upon in
another. By 1929 many states had either adopted some limited
regulations toward investment companies or were investigat-
ing the possibility of so doing. These pre-legislation in-
vestigations revealed abuses and excesses along with the
exercise of fraud being practiced in the sale and management
of investment company securities. Another factor contribut-
ing to the acceptance of regulatory measures was the under-
ng distrust and fear of bigness in economic matters. In-
vestment companies v/ere getting larger, along with other
security industry firms in the 1920' s, and Main Street be-
lieved some control over Wall Street, particularly a growing
-H'/illiam H. Steiner, Investment Trusts, American Ex-






Wall Street, was desirable.
The immediate stimulus to government regulation of
the securities industry was the stock market debacle of 1929.
Both private and governmental investigations during the de-
pression that followed disclosed a large measure of unethical
practices, negligence, and outright fraud to have been pre-
sent prior to the crash. The state laws had certainly proven
inadequate. The experiences of the twenties clearly revealed
the necessity for some regulation. Some measure of regulat-
ing the information presented to purchasers of securities was
deemed, desirable In order to overcome the situation where
information supplied purchasers of securities was truthful,
but not adequate. Also, some discrimination was necessary
between losses resulting from misleading statements and from
market declines. The result of all the Investigations,
studies, and varied proposals offered as a result of the 1929
market crash stimuli was the enactment of a series of Federal
laws designed to remedy the abuses, both real and imaginary,
prevailing during the 1920 r s. The legislation enacted In the
decade of the 1930' s has provided a securities market that is
now a market controlled from many aspects by government agen-
cies. The Federal regulatory measures having applicability
to investment companies may be grouped as follows:
^Willard E. Atkins, George W. Edwards, and Harold G.
Moulton, The Regulation of the Secv Markets (Washington,
D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1946), p. 44.

Federal Securities Act of 1933
Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Investment Advisors Act of 1940
Investment Company Act of 1940
Federal Securities Act of 1953
The Federal Securities Act of 1933 was the first of the
major Federal acts passed during the decade of the 1930 's.
This Act has sometimes been called the "Truth in Securities"
Act. Its purpose is to insure that adequate information
which a prudent investor should know concerning an offered
security is made available to all prospective purchasers.
The Act deals with the initial public distribution of a secur-
ities offering and provides that such distribution may occur-
only after a Registration Statement has been filed with and
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Regis-
tration Statement sets forth a great deal of material infor-
mation about the issuing corporation. A part of the Registra-
tion Statement is the Prospectus which must accompany all
written offers of sale and be provided to all actual purchasers
of the securities. Approval of the Registration Statement by
the SEC does not constitute approval or recommendation of the
^Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.
sec. 77(a) (1964).
2 All en D. Cboka, An Introduction to Securities Regula-




security by the government agency; it merely certifies the
issuer of the securities has met the lawful disclosure require-
ments and the security is authorized to bo offered for sale.
Civil and criminal liabilities are imposed for false or
misleading statements in the Registration Statement. Also,
there are certain classes of security issues that are exempt
from the Act. The exempt classes are small issues, entirely
intrastate issues, government issues, security dealer inven-
tory issues, and nonpublic offerings. - In general, the 1933
Act is not concerned with subsequent trading in a particular
security once the initial distribution to the public has oc-
curred.
Of 3.11 the Federal regulatory laws, the Securities Act
of 1933 is the one cf most importance governing the sale of
investment com/pany securities. Virtually all mutual funds of
any size axe subject to the provisions of the 1933 Act when
selling new securities to the public. The investment company
is required to file a Registration Statement with the SEC and
obtain their approval prior to consumating sales with the
public. A prospectus, submitted to the SEC as a part of the
Registration Statement, must be provided each purchaser of an
investment company's shares. Although oral offers to sell a
new security may be made before the SEC allows the Registra-




must be accompanied, by a prospectus. Any changes occurring
or proposed in the investment company which alters any infor-
mation contained in the original Registration Statement must
be filed with the SEC, and if affecting the prospectus sec-
tions also provided the public shareholders. The Federal
Securities Act of 1933 serves a very useful function by re-
quiring disclosure of the information required for prudent
investment decisions. While the Act requires that this in-
formation be made available to the prospective investor in
mutual funds , or any other security offering, it cannot in-
sure the data is accurate or that the investment is a desir-
able one. SEC approval of a security offering means only
that the issuing orgnanization has complied with the law
by disclosing all the information required. This represents
a giant step forward for investor protection from the situa-
tion that existed in the pre-1929 era and has been one of the
factors contributing to the acceptance of mutual fund companies
by the investing public since 1940. -*
Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The second of the major Federal acts controls, in many
ways, the activities of the securities markets in their daily
9
operations. The Act is actually much broader than its name
J
-See discus-;:' on of the growth of mutual funds on page
11 and Table 1 supra
.
^Securities Ex ige Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934),
15 U.S.C, sec 78(a) (1964).
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implies in that it goes further in its control and regulatory
powers than just the security exchanges. The following list
summarizes the major effects of the 1934 Act.
9 National securities exchanges must register with the SEC
and they and their members are subject to SEC discipline.
© A corporation whose stock is listed on a national exchange
must register with the SEC and furnish periodic reports to
the SEC.
• The directors, officers, and other "insiders" of a corpora-
tion must disclose their trading in the corporation's
securities and may not make "short-swing" profits in the
corporation's securities or sell such securities short.
& The management of a corporation whose securities are listed
on a national securities exchange can solicit proxies for
shareholders T meetings only under rules presecrlbed by the
© Market stabilization, manipulation, and fraud is prohibited
of all persons.
9 Brokers and dealers in securities are subject to SEC dis-
cipline and may engage In their business only pursuant to
SEC rulers.
© Brokers, dealers, and banks may extend credit for buying
or carrying securities only under regulations proscribed
by the Federal Reserve Board.
"Choka, Securities Regulation, p. 40.
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As can be observed from the above listing, the opera-
tional effect of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is indeed
great. The Act contains provisions for the regulation of short
sales, insider trading, listing and delisting of securities on
exchanges, unlisted trading, market manipulation, fra.ud, dis-
cipline of exchanges and their remedies, and several special-
rules concerning brokers and dealers. Further, the rules set
forth on proxy regulation and management actions concerning
solicitation and voting of proxies along with notification of
shareholders of annual meetings is of value to every investor.
While not all of the provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act apply directly to investment companies, a great
measure of regulation and investor protection does accrue to
mutual fur d shareholders from the provisions of the 1334 Act.
The direct benefits are the anti-fraud and market manipulation
provisions, the control exercised over the brokers and dealers,
the insider trading and disclosure section, and the proxy
regulation. Indirect benefits of the Act for the mutual fund
investor are the requirements for registration, the control of
exchanges, the reporting requirements, and the disciplinary
role of the SEC which helps keep the whole securities industry
as well as investment companies in compliance with this and
other Federal regulatory statutes. Although investment com-
panies are not the direct object of this law, they do fall
within several cf its provisions and the result is substantial
inventor protection for the mutual fund shareholder.
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Investment Advisors Act of 1940
Those persons and organizations that hold themselves
out to the public as being in the business of offering in-
vestment advice and counsel must comply with the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940. Compliance is required no matter
whether the advice is offered personnaly, by letter, or by
bulletin or reports. Anyone wishing to be registered as an
investment advisor must register with the SEC, is prohibited
from entering Into profit sharing arrangements with clients,
may not assign his contracts with clients to others, and
must abstain from engaging in fraudulent practices. 1- Regis-
tration by the SEC does not constitute approval of or recom-
mendation of the advisor by the SEC, but merely that the ad-
visor has registered and is complying with the provisions of
the 1940 Investment Advisors Act. The Act also contains
specific exemptions which precludes bankers, brokers and
dealers, trustees, and small professional investment ad-
visors from having to register. The major effect of the
Investment Advisors Act on the mutual fund industry is the
regulation under the Act of those individuals or organiza-
tions who manage the investment of mutual fund assets or
who advise and offer investment policies.
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 850 (1940),







Investment Company Act of 1940
The most complex of the Federal securities acts is
the one dealing with investment companies. Mutual funds,
investment trusts, and closed-end investment companies are
all covered by this Act which controls their activities in
minutiae. In fact, very few of their activities are not
subject to some degree of control under this Act. It was the
intent of Congress to set forth, in detail, the requirements
it considered necessary for adequate regulation of these com-
2panies. The Investment Company Act of 1940 supplements
the other state and Federal laws and provides a comprehensive
system of regulation for investment companies. Regulatory
protection is aimed at preventing certain abuses and elimi-
nating conflicts of interest on the part of those managing
investment companies. The law deliberately avoids attempt-
ing to interfere with management's exercise of honest business
judgment in the selection of the company's investments, and
in no sense does it purport to assure an investor against loss
The objectives of the 1940 Act were developed in the
light of past abuses and difficulties as found by a Congres-
sionally directed study. The Act is intended to do these
1 Investment Company Act of 1940 , 54 Stat. 789 (1940,
15 U.3.C. sees. 80 (a) -1 to -52 (1964).
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1. Provide investors with complete and accurate infor-
mation concerning the character of Investment company secur-
ities and the circumstances, policies, and financial respon-
sibility of investment companies and their management;
2. Assure that investment companies are organized and
operated in the interest of all shareholders rather than in
the interest of officers, directors, investment advisors, or
other special groups or persons;
3. Prevent inequitable provisions in investment com-
pany securities and protect the preferences and privileges of
outstanding securities;
4. Prevent undue concentration of control through pyra-
miding or other devices, and discourage management by irrespon-
sible persons;
5. Assure sound accounting methods;
6. Prevent major changes in organization or business
without the consent of shareholders; and,
7. Require adequate assets or reserves for the conduct
of business.
The Act contains specific provisions designed to achieve
those broad aims. Among them are: definiton, regulation, and_
'( istratlon requirements for investment companies; require-
ments that there be at least a minimum of independent managers
or "outsiders" on the board of directors—meaning persons not
i
senberger, investment Companies, 1970 o. 25.
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otherwise connected with the management; limitations on the
amount of indebtedness that may "be incurred by the investment
company; certain financial management regulations; limitations
on the types of stock which may be issued; provisions to as-
sure shareholders of participation in certain management deci-
sions; requirements for management to comply with SEC rules
in soliciting proxies for voting on company matters; explicit
policies concerning disclosure and financial statements; in-
sider trading limitations; provisions requiring shareholder
approval of changes in fundamental investment policy; and.,
requirements concerning underwriting and management contracts.
In addition., the Act contains a tax benefit provision for
qualifying registered investment companies. Very few facets
of mutual fund operation escape regulation by the Investment
Company Act of 1940 as amended. The most recent amendment
occurred in 1970 with changes being made in the provisions ap-
plying to man nent fees, salesmen's commissions, and front-
end load funds. " These areas will be discussed further In
Chapter III.
The 1910 Investment Company Act Is the single most im-
portant statute concerned with the protection of the mutual
fund Investor. The Act encompasses the entire industry and
its many facets. It attempts to correct the abuses and ex-
cesses found in the Investment company industry in the 1920 's.
1413 (1970).
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 34 Stat.
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The Act is a landmark example in the protection it affords
the individual investor and when coupled with the other Fed-
eral and state laws, provides a sound framework of regulation
for the industry. Certain provisions of the regulatory sta-
tutes state that specific functions arc to be self-regulated
by the industry. This is normally carried out through the
voluntary professional organizations. 1 One of the key parts
to the research question being considered in this thesis is
the adequacy and dependability of the existing regulatory
measures, particularly the self-regulated areas, as they
apply to the management companies in the mutual fund industry,
Considerable emphasis is placed on self-regulation in the
mutual fund industry thereby making it a subject of concern
to the individual investor.
The more well known of these organizations are: NASD
--The National Assoc. on of Securities Dealers; ICT-- invest-




IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT REGULATORY ISSUES
Identification of specific issues which are current
and which relate to the regulation of mutual funds and par-
ticularly to fund managers is necessary and will constitute
the next step in this analysis. Issues which are currently
at the forefront of discussions concerning regulation of the
mutual fund industry will he isolated for further analysis
in Chapter IV. Because of the large number of separate issues,
not all those identified will receive further analysis; how-
ever, specific issues concerned primarily with the regulation
of the management companies associated with mutual funds will
he considered in detail. In addition, several other regu-
latory issues will receive mention as they are ancillary to
the specific research question of this paper.
Any identification process and analysis of issues
relevant to regulation of the investment company institutions
should properly begin with a review of the several studies
that have been conducted over the last decade. Primarily
resulting from Congressional concern about the adequacy of
Federal regulation of the institutional investment community
several In-depth studies exist that were conducted during the
I960 1 :.ch provide rich sources of information. These studies




regulatory issues of Interest to this thesis.
Wharton Report
In 1958, the SEC authorized the Securities Research
Unit of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the
University of Pennsylvania to make a study pursuant to sec-
tion 14(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and to sub-
mit a report to the Commission. The report was delivered to
the SEC and submitted to Congress in 1962. 1 The Wharton Re-
port represented the most comprehensive analysis of the mutual
fund industry since the Commission's Investment Trust Study
which led to the enactment of the Investment Company Act of
p1940. Through the use of detailed questionnaires, data was
compiled on the functional characteristics and market impact
of 189 mutual funds in operation during the target periods of
the study: from 1952 to 1958, and during 1960. The report
presented much factual material about mutual funds and iden-
tified areas in which problems appeared to exist. The infor-
mation gathered dealt with these major areas: (l) growth of
mutual funds ; (?) organization and control of mutual funds;
(3) inv nt policy; (4) investment company performance;
(5) trading impact on the stock market; (6) portfolio company
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control; and, (7) investment advisors of mutual funds. 1 The
report concluded that:
. . . there is little evidence that size per se of in-
dividual funds or companies is a problem at the present
time, and the more important current problems in the
mutual fund industry appear to be those which involve
potential conflicts of interest between fund management
and shareholders, the pos ' : absence of arm's length
bargaining between fund management and investment ad-
visors, and the impact of fund growth and stock purchases
on stock prices.
2
The major conclusions of the Wharton Report are sum-
marized as follows:
1. Growth of Mutual Funds
A. The number of funds, number of shareholders, and net
asset value of funds showed a steady and vigorous in-
crease during the period of the study. This is a con-
tinuation of the rapid growth rate of the mutual fund
industry, beginning in the 1930* s.




2. Organization and. Control of Mutual Funds
A. A large majority of mutual fund organizations are cor-
porations and almost all contract with outside organi-
zation to function as investment advisors.
B. While control technically resides in the voting rights
on Report, pp . 4-
ld., p. X.
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of the shareholders (ownership control), the environment
of the mutual fund industry is strongly conducive to
"management control .
"
C. Active management of most open-ended investment com-
panies is delegated by the board of directors to an
investment advisor. Persons affiliated with the in-
vestment advisor often become the "management control
group" and select directors also affiliated or re-
lated to the investment advisor. This raises questions
concerning the extent to which independent directors
are actually independent and committed to safeguard-
ing the rights of shareholders in negotiations between
the investment company and the investment advisor.
3 . Inve stm en t Po 1 1 cy
A. During the period of the study approximately 75 percent
of the total net assets of funds was held in United
States common stocks. The remainder was evenly spread
among United States corporate bonds, United States
preferreds, foreign securities, and net liquid posi-
tions .
B. Small funds hold larger relative liquidity positions
than do large funds.
C. Differences in announced investment objectives account
for the principal differences in portfolio distribu-
tions among s.
' d
. , pp . 6
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D. Funds practice portfolio diversification, tend toward
issues traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and
exhibit turnover rates inversely related to size with
the smallest funds having the higher turnover rates. *•
4. Investment Company Performance
A. When adjustments are made for portfolio composition,
the average performance of mutual funds did not differ
appreciably from what would have been achieved by an
unmanaged portfolio (i.e., Standard and Foor's Com-
posite Common Stock index) with the same division
among asset types. 2
5. Impact on the Stock Market
A. Mutual funds have played a contributory role in stim-
ulating stock prices markedly during the decade pre-
ceding the study.
B. There is weak evidence that net purchases by mutual
funds significantly affect the month-to-month move-
ments in the market as a whole. There is stronger evi-
dence that fund net purchases significantly affect the
daily movements in the stock market. 3
6. Portfolio Company Control
A. Few mutual funds approach the maximum holdings in a
1 Ibid., pp. 9-16.
., pp. 16-21.
3 Ibld,, pp. 21-23.
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single portfolio company allowable "by the Act of 1940.
Management of mutual funds seem content to emphasize
Investment management rather than participate in
management of portfolio companies,
-
1-
7. Investment Advisors of Mutual Funds
A. There are three principal and Inter-related sources
of income and other benefits that accrue to investment
advisors and affiliated persons maintaining effective
control over mutual funds: (l) advisory and manage-
ment fees; (2) payments for selling activities in
the wholesale and retail distributions of mutual fund
shares; and, (3) brokerage commissions for the purchase
and sale of portfolio securities for the account of
the investment company.
B. Advisory fee rates charged mutual funds average around
one half of one percent per annum of average net
assets. This rate tends to be substantially higher
than the rates charged by the same advisors to their
other clients for comparable asset levels.
C. A conflict of interest situation may exist between
management and shareholder in the area of selling fund
shares.
D. The sale of fund shares is a large factor in allocation
of the funds brokerage by the advisor.




fund shares and tend to limit the flexibility of the
rate structure for large transactions
.
The findings of the Wharton Report appear to indicate
that possible conflict of interest situations between manage-
ment and shareholders exist; shareholders have little nego-
tiating leverage with the management control group; and, it
raises questions as to the extent that independent directors
are actually independent and committed to the best interests
of the shareholders.
Special Study
During 1961, while the Wharton Report was being pre-
pared, Congress added section 19(d) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which authorized and directed the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission to undertake a detailed study
of the securities business and the securities markets. The
object of the study was to determine the adequacy of the
rules of the national securities exchanges and national se-
curities associations for the protection of investors. The
study resulted in a five part report, known as the " Special
Study, " which was submitted to Congress during 1962 and 1963.
The Special Study treated aspects of the mutual fund
industry which fell outside the scope of the Wharton Report
1 lbid.
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2U . S . Congress , House, Report of the Spec
i
al Study of
the Securities ; :
,
H.R. 95, 83th Cong., 1st sess., 1963.





The major areas of concern were: (l) selling practices;
(2) allocation of mutual fund portfolio brokerage; and,
(3) insider transactions in portfolio securities. The ma-
jor conclusions of the Special Study are as follows
:
1. Selling Practices:
A. Certain factors peculiar to the mutual fund industry
create pressures toward undesirable selling prac-
tices. A consorted effort by the industry, trade
associations, and the SEC should be undertaken to
eliminate undesirable selling tactics and devices
through adoption of Rules of Fair Practice. Secon-
dary supervisory controls by industry members are
also desirable.
B. Prospectus requirements should bo refined to assure
that all basic information is presented clearly and
conspicuously brought to the attention of the pros-
pective investor.
C. Legislation should be proposed to abolish or greatly
modify the front- end load feature and other items re-
lating to contractural plans.'
2. Allocation of Portfolio Brokerage:
A. The economies of the value of securities transactions
generated by the mass purchasing power of the funds




primary beneficiaries are their investment advisors
and their frequently related principal underwriters,
who use reciprocity to reward sales efforts of fund
retailers thereby increasing their own rewards.
B. The give-up in its various forms is in conflict
with the duty of a fund and its advisor to obtain
best terms in their securities transactions.
C. Mutual fund directors, investment advisors, and
operating officials who carry out portfolio business
for the fund are primarily obligated to obtain the
best available terms in such transactions for the
benefit of fund shareholders without regard to the
reciprocal business aspects of the transactions, and
to see that the funds themselves receive the maxi-
mum benefits available from any such reciprocal bus-
iness. The choice of market should be made exclu-
sively from this point of view and not on the basis
2
of rewarding broker-dealers for their sales efforts.""
3. Insider Trading:
A. Close regulation of insider trading in accordance with
with SEC approved policy should be required of each
z
registered investment company.
For a detailed discussion of the give-up issue see
Chapter IV, infra.
^Special Study, pp. 234-235.
5 Ibid,, p. 255.

36
The Special Study , while dealing with the securities
marl-rets as a whole, resulted in proposed adjustments to the
regulation of mutual funds in order to eliminate abuses and
increase investor protection in the areas of selling, broker-
age allocation, and insider trading.
Public Policy Report
This report was submitted to Congress in 1966. The
study represented the first report by the SEC to Congress on
the subject of Investment Company regulation since the passage
of the 1*940 Act. Neither the Wharton Report nor the Special
Study was a report by the Commission. Rather, the V.'harton
Report was a report to the SEC, not by the SEC, and was an
analytical study that made no recommendations for legislative
action. The Special Study, on the other hand, did contain
recommendations; but, those were the recommendations of the
staff which prepared the Study—not of the Commission. It
remained for the Commission to evaluate the public policy
questions that were raised by the publication of the two pre-
ceding reports. A comprehensive review of the Special Study
recommendation against the background of the basic questions
raised by the Wharton Report and the SEC ' s own experience in
linistering the Federal securities statutes resulted in the
Commission transmitting its legislative proposals to Congress





The Public Policy Report sought to test the conclu-
sions of the V/harton Report and the Special Study by an in-
tensive first hand examination of a cross section of the
investment company industry. The scope of the study was
focused on the areas where mutual fund growth had raised
questions as to the adequacy of the existing regulatory
pattern. The specific matters analyzed in the report, in
addition to a general review of the mutual fund industry,
are: (l) management function end. its cost; (2) portfolio
transactions; (3) distribution and its cost; (4) mutual fund
size and investment performance; (T>) investment company
growth and market impact; and, (6) investment company re-
lationships with portfolio companies.-
The Public Policy Report asked for legislation to
strengthen the regulatory system applying to the mutual fund
industry. The specific .changes recommended and proposed in
legislation were:
1. Place a 5 percent celling on mutual fund sales charges
that currently were averaging 9.3 percent on dollars in-
vested.
2. Enact a "standard of reasonableness" for management fees
-U.S. Congre s s , House , Report of the Securiti es and
-
hange Coamission on the Publi c pQlic~y~Inpllc at ion"? o F
.
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that currently average one half of 1 percent per annum
of net assets.
3. Eliminate "front-end load" contractural plans.
4. Ban mutual fund holding companies.
5. Prohibit give-ups of brokerage fees.
6. Establish a procedure for granting volume discounts.
7. Closely regulate and police insider trading to insure that
fund managers do not take advantage of inside information
concerning the fund's investment plans or practices.
8. Take a more active interest in portfolio companies by pro-
hibiting the sale of any company that manages a mutual
fund if the ownership change might burden the fund's share-
holders or limit the future action of the fund.
The fate of the proposed regulatory changes, following
their submission to Congress,, is discussed below. The Public
Policy Stvdy remains the most recent document consisting of
the SEC ' s recommendations concerning the adequacy of Federal
regulation statutes in providing protection for the mutual fund
investor.
Legislative Action
The SEC followed up its Public Policy Report by pre-
senting to Congress, in Hay, 1967, its proposed bill—the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1967. While contain-
ing many technical changes, the bill proposed the major amend-
1 S. 1653, 90th Cong., 1st sess., (1967).

merits deemed desirable by the SEC as highlighted in the Public
Policy Report . These amendments asked specifically for a
standard of "reasonableness" in respect to management fees
which would be enforceable in the courts; a ceiling of 5
percent of asset value on sales charges; and, the outlawing
of new contractural plans. A later amendment would have per-
mitted banks to enter the mutual fund business. The drastic
recommendations of the SEC ' s report, and the bill which sought
to put them into effect, were not accepted by the Commerce
and Finance Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce or the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, the Congressional committees, under whose jurisdic-
tion the proposal rested. A bill was passed in the Senate
which retained the standard of reasonableness as to manage-
ment fees, left the question of sales charges to a study and
disposition by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
permitted a "stretch-out" of commissions on contractural plans
so that such levies could not exceed 64 percent of the amount
invested in the first four years, and permitted the entry of
pbanks into the mutual fund business. While there were ex-
tended hearings on the SEC ' s proposals before the House sub-
-LThis provision was not included in the subsequent
legislation that became lav;. Further, a. Supreme Court ruling
of April 5, 1971 declared that banks cannot legally enter the
mutual fund industry because operation of "investment accounts"
(another term for mutual fund) by banks would be in violation
of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933.
9
t'Jiesenberger, Iny e s trnen t C ompa ni e s , 19 70, p. 26.
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committee, no action was taken by the House.
In 1968, a bill similar to the 1967 bill was intro-
duced in the Senate by Senator John Sparkman. The bill,
known as the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1968, passed
the Senate by voice vote in July, 1968, after two days of de-
bate. In September, 1968, the House Commerce Committee de-
cided not to consider the measure.
January, 1969 saw two bills introduced in the Senate
relating to mutual fund regulation. The first was the Spark-
man Bill, which was the same as that which Senator Sparkman
had introduced in the previous year and which had passed the
9
Senate." The second was introduced by Senator Thomas J.
Mclntyre, a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
of which Senator Sparkman is Chairman.
The Mclntyre Bill differed drastically . from the Spark-
man Bill. It asked for repeal of Section 22(d) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, the so-called "price maintenance"
provision of the Act that serves to maintain an orderly mar-
ket in mutual fund shares and prevents price discrimination
between Investors. Senator Mclntyre also asked for the aboli-
tion of contractual plans and a change in the basis for action
against an advisor or underwriter from "gross misconduct or
1S. 2724, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., (1968).
2 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st sess,, (1969).
3S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st sess., (1969).
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gross abuse of trust, " as stated now in the Act, to "breach
of fiduciary duty, " A third bill emerged as the final Senate
version.-*- This measure embodied features of the previously
introduced bills but more closely resembled the Sparkman bill.
In March, 1969, Representative William S. Stuckey in-
troduced a bill in the House which would drastically revise
the major provisions of the Sparkman and Mc Intyre bills.
The Stuckey bill was seen as being more tolerable to the
mutual fund industry than the Senate passed version; however,
no final House action was forthcoming by the end of 1969.
With the convening of the second session of the 91st
Congress, in 1970, there was pending before the House the
Senate bill, S. 2224, which had passed the Senate on Kay 27,
1969; an identical version, H.R. 11995, introduced by Repre-
sentative John Moss, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance; and another bill, H.R. 14737, intro-
duced by Representative W. S. Stuckey, which differed con-
siderably from the Senate version. As was the case the year
before, the Stuckey bill was the more acceptable to the
mutual fund industry but less acceptable from the poiiit-of-
view of the orignal intent of the SEC proposals submitted
almost four years earlier. The House subcommittee finally
yielded and approved a mutual fund regulation bill which
1S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st sess., (1969).
H.R. 8980, 91st Cong., 1st sess., (1969).

42
emerged from the committee less Industry oriented than the
Stuckey proposals, but still considerably different from the
Senate passed bill- House approval came late in the year and,
following conference committee action, Congress passed the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970.
Thus, nearly four years after the Public Po licy Report
recommendations were presented to Congress, the first major
amendments were made to the Investment Company Act since its
passage in 1940. The Amendments Act of 1970 contained over
fifty separa.te amendments, many of a purely technical nature,
but with the following major provisions:
A. Management Fees:
The SEC or a shareholder is given the right to test in
court whether the investment advisor to a fund has ful-
filled his "fiduciary duty" with respect to the size of
the fees the fund must pay for his services.
B. Sales Commissions:
Industry self-regulation is provided for through the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, an industry self-
regulatory body, which is directed to study and establish
policy regarding the general level of sales charges.
C. Front-end Loads:
Front-end loaded contractual plans must refund 85 percent
of its sales charges if an investor abandoned the plan




within eighteen months. Further, front-end load plans
cannot impose more than 64 percent of their sales charges
during the first four years, or more than 20 percent
during any one year.
C. Performance Fees:
Investment advisor compensation contracts containing slid-
ing scale fees, based on performance, would have to be
decreased as well as increased in line with performance
relative to certain stock indexes
.
Additional analysis of the provisions contained in the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 and its relation to
the conclusions of the various studies that precedes its
passage will be undertaken In subsequent sections. The primary
subjective evaluation that may be applied to the act at the
present is that the major provisions strengthen the 1940 Act
and provide additional investor protection, but certain pro-
visions remain cause for investor concern.
Twentieth Century Fund Study
The Twentieth Century Fund, a non-profit, non-partisan
research foundation which undertakes timely, critical and ana-
lytical studies of major economic, political and social Insti-
tutions and issues, sponsored a study of institutional in-
vestors and their economic effect on the stock market and
securities industry. The study, beginning in 1968, was carried
"-Wall Street Journal, November 24, 1970, p. 4.
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out "by the Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School of
Finance ana Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, with the
report being published in 1970." Primarily economically ori-
ented, this study analyzed the implications for the economy
as a whole of the increasing importance of institutional
investors in the stock market, with particular emphasis on
mutual funds. Much of the data presented in the study repre-
sents an updating of the Wharton Report ; however, the eco-
nomic impact of mutual funds on the economy is treated in
much greater depth. Due to the inaccessability of confiden-
tial data from the fund management groups, certain areas re-
ceiving analysis in the Wharton Report are not updated in the
Twentieth C entury Fund Study . These areas of omission are:
(l) any analysis of the effect of fund activity on very short-
term stock market movements; (2) information on mutual fund
control of portfolio companies; and, (3) conflicts of inter-
est between fund shareholders and management.
This study represents a different approach than the
1Irwin Friend, Marshall Blume, 'and Jean Crockett, Mutual
Funds and Other In stitutional Investors (New York: McGraw-Hill






It is significant that the senior researcher for the
1970 leth Centura Fund Study was also the senior researcher
for I ort . He is Professor Irwin Friend, Wharton
School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania;
also Director of the Securities Research Unit and Consumer
Expenditures Unit at Wharton School.

other studies reported in this chapter. The orientation of
the 1970 study is primarily economical while the other studies
have represented the regulatory point of view. In addition,
the Twenieth Century Fund Study utilizes methods of statisti-
cal and other data analysis not available to the researchers
before and represents the most sophisticated treatment of sta-
tistical data apparent in any of the studies reported herein.
The study, in addition to presenting an overview of the insti-
tutional investment field and the trends such investment has
taken in recent years, has as its major subject areas the
following: (l) investment performance of mutual funds; (2)
mutual funds and market efficiency; (3) impact of mutual funds
on market movements; and, (4) impact of institutional in-
vestors on market efficiency. Further, some major policy
issues receive brief comment.
The primary conclusions reached by the researchers in
the Twenieth Century Fund Study are summarized as follows:
1. Institutional investment: an overview and trends:
A. Institutional investment has evidenced phenomenal growth
over the past several years. This growth has created
stress in certain areas, particularly the mutual fund
area, but has generally been a favorable factor in
the general economy.
B. Trends over the last two decades in institutional in-
vesting have been:




(2) toward common stocks and away from government
securities as the major portfolio holdings;
(3) toward wider representation of the general in-
vest ing publie; and
,
(4) a movement towards emphasis on market value growth
and away from earnings yield, at least in the
mutual fund section.
2. Investment performance of mutual funds:
A. In general, funds have not matched the performance of
the unweighted portfolio of the New York Stock Exchange
during the 1960-1969 period. But, they have matched
the performance of the weighted portfolio, and the high-
risk funds have surpassed it, especially in the 1964-
1968 period.
B. Regardless of their market performance, mutual funds
have served useful economic functions of: (l) provid-
ing diversity for small investors; (2) raising average
return for investments of small investors; and (3)
their large purchases have helped narrow risk differ-
entials between common stock and other forms of in-
vestment.
C. No consistent relationship appears to exist between
Investment performance and fund size, management ex-
Twentieth Century Fund Study, pp. 1-49.
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pense, portfolio turnover, or sales charges.
3. Mutual funds and market efficiency:
A. Mutual funds as a whole are neither especially good
nor especially bad In directing capital into profit-
able areas of investment. This holds true for both
long-run and short-run timing.
B. There appears to be a significant amount of follow-
the- leader type of investment policy where a number
of fund managers follow their more successful col-
2leagues investment behavior.
4. Impact of mutual funds on market movements:
A. There is no significant evidence that mutual funds
have the ability to predict or to influence quarterly
or monthly movements in the stock market as a whole.
B. While the evidence is slim, there is some indication
that mutual funds may in their trading of individual
issues either anticipate or cause subsequent abnor-
mally large price movements.
5. Impact of institutional investors on market efficiency:
A. In spite of the greatly increased stock activity by
institutional investors, there does not appear to be
any noteworthy trend in market efficiency. This is
1 Ibid., pp. 22,50-68.
2 Ibid., pp. 72, 79.
Ibid
., pp. 80-90. The price movement issue is consid-
ed further in the Ins tl tutlonal Investor Study, infra.
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supported by earlier findings that mutual funds shov/ed
neither superior nor inferior ability to direct in-
vestment capital into areas which result in the most
profitable returns.
The Twenti eth Century Fund Study emphasizes the eco-
nomic effect of institutional investing and ha.s little to say
about the regulating issues that are of concern in this research
effort. Three areas of policy issues are identified as being
worthy of inspection. Those are: (l) Are there undesirable
effects associated with the rapid and continuing rate of growth
of institutional investment, and, If so, should that growth be
controlled? (2) Should certain characteristics of institu-
tional investing in the area of portfolio company policies and
trading practices be restricted? and, (3) Are new measures re-
quired to provide adequate protection in the areas of conflict
of Interest between institutional investors and management
groups? These issues are relevant to the basic research ques-
tion of this thesis and the viewpoints projected by the Twen-
tieth Century Fund Study on these issues are considered in the'
formulation of the conclusions contained in Chapter V.
Institutional Investor " Study Report
A Congressional joint resolution of July, 1968 directed...






study of institutional investors and their effects on the se-
curities markets, the Interests of the issuers of securities,
and the public interest. The results of this study were re-
ported to Congress, in March of 1971, as the Institution al
Investor Study Report . The primary areas of concern inves-
tigated by the study are: (l) institutions as investment
managers; (2) the impacts of institutional investing on secur-
ities markets; arid, (3) the impacts of institutional investors
on corporate issues.
The Ins titutional Investors Study placed heavy emphasis
on the application of quantitative, mathematical techniques to
the analyses of economic and regulatory problems. The study
covers all types of investor institutions. The major findings
of the study that apply to investment companies follow:
A« Investment Hanagers : Competitive pressure for improved
investment performance has spread to investment managers
of all types, forcing them to assume higher levels of risk
in making their portfolio investments. The SEC believes
improved disclosure of investment returns, portfolio ac-
tivity and short-term trading is needed to better Inform
holders of such risks. It also believes changes are needed
in the system of incentive fees that portfolio managers
•^-U.S. Congress, House, Ins titutional Investor Study
Report of tV ' . . cjirities a nd Exc - Commission, H.R', 92-64,
92nd Cong.., 1st sess., 1971. (Hereinafter referred to as the
Institutional Investor Study.
)
2 lb id., p. VIII.
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receive, suggesting that such systems provide penalties
for below-par investment performance that are "symmetrical"
with rewards for above-average performance.
3« Nev: Issues ; It does not appear that institutions, as a
group, are receiving preferential treatment in obtaining
shares of desirable new stock issues. Nor has their par-
ticipation 'been so limited that there is concern about a
scaracity of available capital for newer, smaller enter
prises . ""
C. Market Effect : The study concludes that the growth of in-
stitutional trading does not necessitate the imposition of
any curbs or limitations on th? extent of such trading.
In fact, it is suggested that any stock curb could Impair
the liquidity of the nation's securities markets. In gen-
eral, institutional trading contributes to relatively few
of the large price swings In the stock market and that, as
a rule, institutional trading appears to counteract price
movements about as often as it appears to contribute to
them. Stock market price stability has not been disturbed
by institutional trading,
D. Institutional Membership : The report states that the SEC '
s
experience to date has not shown any regulatory problems
severe enough to justify "sweeping prohibitions" against
1
v:?.ll Street Journal, March 11, 1971, p. 6.




institutions becoming stock exchange members. But, the
commission withheld a final decision on the issue, pend-
ing action by the stock exchanges to eliminate fixed mini-
mum rates on portions of stock transactions over $500,000.
The SEC has told the New York Stock Exchange to eliminate
such rates by April 5, 1971. It is believed that nego-
tiated rates would lower brokerage costs for the insti-
tutions and, therefore, discourage them from seeking seats
on the exchanges.
E. Improved Institutional Reporting: There are currently "gaps"
of information about the purchase, sale and holdings of
securities by major classes of institutional investors.
These shortcomings should be eliminated through legisla-
tion giving the SEC authority to require standardized per-
iodic reports from all types of financial institutions.
Once the lav; is passed, the SEC would consult with other
regulatory agencies on the form, frequency and content of
the reports and on arrangements whereby different agencies
could share the data that is reported. Individual in-
vestors would also have access to this data.
? » Market Structure : The Commission does not believe it should
try to devise a particular market structure. But, its
"objective" is a "strong central market system" that would
provide access to all investors, allow all "qualified"
broker-dealers to participate and be controlled by "appro-
priate regulation" and competitive forces. The commission

should try to prevent the evolution of the marketplace
from being distorted by "unnecessary restraints" on com-
petition, such as fixed minimum commissions and rules that
keep broker-dealers from dealing with each other- Fur-
ther, the study concludes that geographically separate
trading markets are feasible and can be tied together on
a national basis through the use of modern communications
and data processing techniques.
Q* Corporate Takeover : The report suggests that Congress re-
examine existing laws and consider prohibiting transactions
in which mutual funds and other institutional investors
get advance information about a planned take-over in re-
turn for aiding it. The recommendation is aimed primarily
at cases in which an institutional investor buys stock in
a target company on behalf of the acquiring concern, then
"parks'' it in his portfolio until the acquiring corpora-
tion makes a tender offer at an attractive price. The
SEC has long been concerned about the role of mutual funds
in such take-overs, but it has been uncertain whether ex-
isting law is adequate to deal with it. The report contain!
ten case studies of participation by institutions in take-
over transactions. The cases involve instances where, in
the SEC's opinion, the institution exerted too much influ-
ence in merger activities, where there was an exchange of
confidential information between the acquiring companies
and an institution, and where several institutions acted
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in concert with one another after getting "inside" infor-




H. Disclosure : The report urges congressional consideration
of an amendment to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act that
v/ould require institutions -to disclose holdings of equity
securities that exceed 5 percent (currently 10 percent)
of an outstanding securities issue. This would include
not only securities that are "beneficially owned by an
institution but also shares under common investment manage-
ment. Thus, an investment advisor would report shares
held by various investment companies and other accounts
it manages if the aggregate holdings exceed the 5 percent
level. Also, the study suggests broadening such disclo-
sures even further to require institutions to state more.
specifically their policies or. involvement in corporate
affairs. Unless more information is required, the study
says, the SEC carmo-t "intelligently" assess the degree of
influence institutions exert over portfolio companies.
2
The Institutional Investor Study made no legislative
recommendations. The study will probably be the basis for
additional recommendations to those listed above after the
Commission reviews the report further. If additional legis-
lation is deemed necessary, based on the findings of the re-
port, such legislation would be drafted and submitted to the
iy/all Street Journal, March 11, 1971, p. 6.
2Wall Street Journal, March 8, 1971, p. 1.
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Congress.; however, the SEC ' s rather mild conclusions, based
on the study research, would seem to indicate that additional
legislation is not imminent.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OP CURRENT REGULATORY ISSUES
Chapter III identified the issues most commonly associ-
ated with mutual fund regulation as presented by the various
studies conducted during the prior decade. New legislation
was enacted in 1970 to correct some of the issues; however,
some areas of investor protection remain subject to additional
analysis and possible future regulation. It is the effective-
ness of existing regulatory measures and adequacy of protec-
tion afforded investors in those areas which are directly re-
lated to the actions of the mutual fund management companies
that will be the subject of analysis in this Chapter.
Discussion of Current Issues
Recent studies have not revealed any new regulatory
issues, but instead have reaffirmed the old issues and updated
the research data. The most descriptive listing of regulatory
issues is that contained in the Public Policy Report . There-
fore, the terminology of that report will be used here as a
framework for discussion. Of the six basic issues stemming
from the Public Policy Report, only four are directly con-
cerned with mutual fund management companies. Mutual fund size
and investment performance is considered a function of In-
vestor interest and share purchases, not a result of manage-
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ment company actions. The idea that management company sales
efforts contribute in large measure to larger size funds is a
valid argument, "but the issue of fund promotion will be con-
sidered in the areas of distribution and. its cost. Likewise,
the issue of investment company growth and market impact is
considered outside the area of the basic research question.
Germane to the question of the adequacy of regulation of mutual
fund management companies are the following issues:
1. the management function and its cost;
2. portfolio transactions;
3. distribution and its cost; and,
4. relationships with portfolio companies.
Management Func tion and its Cost
Most mutual funds eve managed by external investment ad-
visory organizations which are controlled by the fund's organ-
izers or by their successors. Mutual fund advisory organiza-
tions, or management companies as they have been referred to
in this report, often manage large pools of capital, but it
is not unusual for them to employ relatively few people and
require relatively little of their own capital. In addition
to investment advice, the investment advisor often furnishes
certain administrative services, office space and facilities, ••
and sometimes pays the compensation of the officers and em-
ployees of the fund. In return, the fund pays the management
company a fee for Its services. Stock transfers, dividend
disbursing, and custodial services represent the most substan-
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tial non-advisory services required by mutual funds, but the
cost of these services are usually not paid for by the ad-
visory fee. Investment advisor organizations often provide
their services to a group or family of funds, Beyond a cer-
tain point, further increases in the mutual fund's assets does
not lead to commensurate increases in the costs of furnishing
the fund with investment advice and other management services.
There are considerable economies of size which result. This
situation reflects the fact that management of a small port-
folio requires much the same general economic market forecast-
ing., analysis of various industries, and evaluation of individ-
ual securities as does the management of a large portfolio.
Under the present mode of operation these economies of scale
accrue to the benefit of the investment company management
group. The Wharton Report found that most investment advisors
were not sharing any economies of size with the fund share-
holders. In four out of every five cases the mutual fund ad-
visory fee rates were fixed and did not vary with the size of
the assets managed. 1- Studies over the last ten years show that
1For example. Investors Diversified Services, Inc.,
manages six funds having total assets of over $6.3 billion;
Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc., manages twelve separate funds
with assets of over- $1.4 billion; Putman Management Company,
Inc., advises nine funds having assets of $1.5 billion; Vance
Sanders and Company, Inc., advises seven funds with assets of
$3.7 billion; and, Wellington Management Company which manages
over $2.3 billion in twelve fund,.. In April, 1971, there were
21 management companies advising five or more funds. Source:
"113 71 Mutual Fund Guide," Fund scope, April, 1971.
'Ivnerton Report, p. 480.
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management fees have tended to cluster heavily around the trad-
itional rate of 0,50 percent of average net asset value per
annum. An examination of fifty of the largest, most popular
funds shows that reducing scale formulas have increased in
use since 1960; however, they are still the exception rather
than the rule. The descriptive situation is still a manage-
ment fee of one half of one percent per year of average net
asset value. ^ Incentive formulas, based on performance in
relation to one of the popular market indexes have become more
popular. Normally management groups propose incentive formu-
la advisory fee plans only in those cases where past experi-
ence has shown favorable market performance. Therefore, these
formulas often result in even higher fees being paid for the
management functions. Also, management companies advising
several funds accrue tremendous economies of scale, yet main-
tain advisory contracts with all their funds providing for fees
at the standard rate.
The management fees paid by mutual funds are considerably
higher than those charged for other types of investment manage-
ment. They are substantially higher than the fee paid banks
for the management of pension funds and profit sharing plans.
For example, the advisory fee chargeable to a £100 million
portfolio under the bank fee schedules for pension and profit
sharing plans averaged 0.0G percent in 1965 as compared to the
1971 Mutual Fund Guide," Fundscope, April, 1071.

59
0.50 percent rate commonly charged "by mutual funds of compar-
able size."1" Also mutual fund management fee rates are sub-
stantially higher than those charged registered investment
companies which are operated by banks and other institutions
as equity investment vehicles.' In 1965 the average manage-
ment fee for such companies was 0.12 percent of average net
assets. Mutual fund advisory fee rates also are consider-
ably higher than the rates that private individuals pay for
investment advice and management for comparable asset levels.
While the basic annual rate is often 0.50 percent this rate
is usually halved for portfolios ranging from $1 million to
$2 million and can be negotiated even lower for portfolios
in excess of $3 million. These fees for individual inves-
tors usually also cover services, such as custodial services,
not provided mutual funds. Lie the managerial services re-
quired by the various investment medium differ somewhat the
Public Policy, Report concluded that "these differences do not
adequately explain the extent of the disparity between other
types of investment management and mutual fund advisory fee
I! 4
rates. It should be noted, however, that several fully
litigated cases have failed to prove that the present fees
1 Public Policy Report
, pp. 11, 114-113.
Ibid.
, pp. 11, 118-113.
5 Ibid




are unreasonable or excessive. The reasons for the relatively
stable, and in the opinion of some excessive, mutual fund
management fees are twofold. First there is a lack of compe-
tition for management contracts, the shareholders are usually
faced with acceptance of the management contract offered by
management or the uncertainty of operation without a manage-
ment contract or investment advisor. Secondly, there has
been wide shareholder acceptance of standard fee rates asso-
ciated with rising markets. The result has been a relatively
stable one half of one percent yearly management fee for most
mutual funds. This is higher than comparable fees for similar
investment advice and management, disregards the economies of
scale inherent to the larger funds, and in the end represents
an increasingly large cost for the fund to bear at the expense
of the shareholders.
Present regulation pertaining to advisory fees consists
of two items. Federal securities law requires full disclosure
of management compensation in the investment company industry.
However, because neither cost considerations nor competitive
factors influence a fund's choice of advisor, the restraint
of disclosure is less effective on managerial compensation in
the mutual fund industry than it is in other industries. The -
other form present regulation takes in relation to management
fees is the requirement that both stockholders and unaffiliated
directors approve advisory contracts. This provision has rare-
ly operated to provide fund shareholders with an adequate
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share of the economies of size. Because of the absence of com-
petition, the limitations of disclosure, the ineffectiveness
of shareholder voting rights, and the difficulty of effective
action "by unaffiliated directors advisory fee rates have not
declined as funds grew in size. Only as a result of the
pressures generated by the Wharton Report coupled with the
pendency of shareholder litigation have such departures as
there have been occurred from the traditional flat fee of one
half of one percent. These departures have been few and sel-
dom very- substantial.
The Public Policy Report recommended and the SEC sub-
sequently submitted legislation providing for a "standard of
reasonableness which would be enforceable in the courts" with
regard to management fees. The proposal that the courts could
be asked to pass judgment on the reasonableness of management
fees was attacked by opponents within the mutual fund industry
as a true rate-making statute that would place the SEC in the
position to control management fees. The proposal was also
condemned on the grounds that it would open up a plethora of
shareholder lawsuits that would seriously interfere with manage-
ment's duties. The eventual legislation that became law was
the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 which provided
either the SEC or the individual shareholder the right to test
in court whether the investment advisor to a fund has fulfilled
his fiduciary duty with respect to the size of the fees a fund
1
S, 2224 91st Cong., 1st sess., (1969).
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must pay for the advisory services. Insufficient time has
elapsed following the implementations of this provision for
any court tests to be completed.
The Institutional Investment Study Report, submitted sub-
sequent to the enactment of the' Investment Company Amendments
Act but in preparation concurrently with the consideration of
the legislation, recommended that certain changes are needed
in the system of incentive fees that some fund managers re-
ceive. Specifically, the study suggested that such systems
provide for penalties for below par investment performance
that would be symmetrical with rewards for above average per-
formance. Ironically, the 1970 Amendments Act contained a
provision requiring that investment advisor compensation con-
tracts contain sliding scale fees based on performance would
have to be decreased as well as increased in line with per-
formance relative to certain stock indexes.
Research conducted over the past decade and reported
in connection with a major study of the industry indicates
that the existing regulatory provisions which apply to the
subject of management advisory fees have proven inadequate
in providing mutual fund shareholders the degree of reason-
able protection they could logically expect.'- The three
factors of acknowledged economies of size, unchanging man-
-^- Insti tutional Investors Study
,
p. XIV.
2 Publie Policy Report, p. 12-13.
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agement fees, and the continued concern and interest about the
issue on the part of the industry, SEC, and Congress that re-
sulted in an amendment to the law strengthening the regula-
tory statutes in relation to advisory fees seems to conclu-
sively prove the inadequacy of the existing provisions. How
adequate the new provision enacted with the 1970 Amendments
Act will prove to he must await a reasonable test of time.
The measure of effectiveness of management fee regula-
tory provisions is difficult. While the existing statutes
were inadequate and failed to effectively protect the inter-
ests of the shareholders regarding advisory fees, the case
could also be argued that the laws were effective in that dis-
closure was accomplished and both shareholder and unaffiliated
directors do approve advisory contracts. Therefore, the ex-
isting regulations were effective, they accomplished what they
were supposed to do but were inadequate to accomplish the in-
tended task of adequate- shareholder protection. The effective-
ness of the new "fiduciary duty" provisions of the Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970 cannot be determined until after
a sufficient period of time has passed to allow litigation to
be completed.
With "respect to the issue of management fees, it is
recommended that the provisions of the 1970 Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act be given a reasonable time trial. If those
efforts are insufficient to cause some significant changes to
occur that insures some measures of the economies of size be:
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returned to the shareholders In the form of reduced or sliding
scale advisory fees, then legislation should he extended to
accomplish this change. Any legislation which might eventu-
ally he required should avoid rate making powers to the extent
possible, hut should arrange a .standard of reasonableness that
would he workable in the industry. The voluntary, or if
necessary, the forced adoption by the industry of a reducing
scale management fee with incentive, both of the reward and
penalty type, based on performance is accomplishing the fund's
investment objective Is considered the optimum solution to the
issue of the management function and its cost. Adoption of
those measures would result in the shareholders receiving some
measure of the economies of size as well as the management ad-




The large number of portfolio transactions and the sub-
stantial amount of brokerage costs these transactions generate
have become an increasingly important source of revenue to the
securities industry. For example, in 1965 these charges amounted
to over $100 million for the mutual fund sector alone. The
large volume of portfolio transactions and the resulting large •
amounts of brokerage are the result of two factors. First,





the growth which has taken place in both the size and. number
of mutual funds over the past twenty years accounts for a large
measure of the volume. Secondly, the rise of the performance
managers who are often characterized by their rapid portfolio
turnover practices in quest of above average fund performance
has also contributed to the large volume of mutual fund port-
folio transactions. The result of those two factors has been
an extremely large volume of brokerage business generated by
the mutual fund industry. This large increase has generated
its share of problems along with its large dollar volume of
commissions. The major problem areas are: (l) allocation of
brokerage. (2) the problem of reciprocals and give-ups; (3)
broker affiliated funds] (4) exchange membership for funds]
and, (5) negotiated commissions.
Portfolio holdings of investment companies tend to be
heavily concentrated in securities listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. While some mutual fund transactions are executed on
regional exchanges and in the over-the-counter market, the vast
majority of the fund transactions are executed on the New York
Stock Exchange. 2 Charges for the execution of transactions in
the over-the-counter market are subject to negotiation] how-
ever, on the other exchanges, brokerage commissions are gov-
erned by exchange minimum commission rate schedules. This means
1See Chapter II, supra for discussion concerning growth
of mutual funds.
2 Public Policy Report, pp. 15, 157.
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that the commission on a 10,000 share order is 100 times that
commission for a 100 share order. This situation presents a
very lucrative operation on large orders and consequently
brokers compete vigorously among themselves for investment
company patronage. One study found that on the NYSE the aver-
age cost of handling a 1,000 share, a 10,000 share, and a
100,000 share order of a $40 stock was, respectively, 6,
42, and 377 times the 100 share commission. Since a large
portion of investment company portfolio transactions involve
a large block of shares., the brokerage business of mutual funds
is eagerly sought after and represents a large contribution to
the profitability of the securities industry.
Because of the profitability involved in conducting
mutual fund trades, exchange members are often willing to
execute and clear transactions for mutual funds for a fraction
of the commissions they must charge them. They allow mutual
fund managers to allocate a substantial portion of the broker-
age to other brokers who had nothing to do with the execution
of the transaction on which the brokerage was earned. Some
of this brokerage is allocated to broker-dealers for non- sales
services such as investment research, investment recommenda-
tions, communications facilities, pricing services, and others.
This practice is to the benefit of the shareholders. However*
many managers, prior to the practice being prohibited at the
\
• Institutional Investor Study, p. 102.
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end of 1968, used a substantial portion (60 to 70 percent) of
the funds brokerage to pay dealers extra compensation for
sales of fund shares. This practice known as the "customer
directed give-up., " so called because the fund manager directed
the broker who executes the order to give-up portions of that
commission to one or more designated brokers who have no con-
nection with the transaction, was not in the best interest of
the fund shareholder. Generally the individual shareholder
does not benefit from additional sales of fund shares, but
the management company stands to benefit from a larger fund
through receiving larger fees. However, the brokerage gen-
erated by a fund transaction is a fund asset and should be
used for the benefit of the fund shareholders, not the manage-
ment advisory company. Thus, the temptation to allocate bro-
kerage and give-ups to generate sales at the expense of using
the same funds to pay for investment information or other
non-sales services is an area requiring attention by those
responsible for protecting the best interests of the fund
shareholders.
The impact of give-up and reciprocal practices in the
mutual fund industry was great. Reciprocity is an accepted
custom of the business world; however, it had a unique char-
acter in the mutual fund industry. As noted above, the use
of brokerage commissions as extra compensation to retailers
of fund shares primarily benefits the fund advisor-underwriter
rather than the fund and its shareholders. The fund and its
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shareholders could derive greater benefits from their broker-
age If give-ups were transferred to the fund for the purpose
of offsetting management costs or other expenses. The use
of brokerage for sales compensation perpetuates the potential
for harmful practices on the part of management companies.
The temptation to skimp on allocation of brokerage for invest-
ment advice in favor of accelerated sales; the pressures for
churning of the fund portfolio to generate brokerage commis-
sions; the danger that reciprocal and give-up practices may
impair the integrity of dealer recommendations; the hidden
influences which perspective brokerage give-ups might have on
dealers activities; and the anti-competitive efforts between
funds of different sizes are all factors which mitigated
against the reciprocal and give-up practices employed by the
mutual fund industry.
Modification of the above conditions resulted from the
rate changes adopted by the NYSE on December 5, 1968. On
that date the exchange adopted an interim commission rate sched-
ule which Incorporated a volume discount and prohibited cus-
tomer directed give-ups. The ASE and regional exchanges
adopted similar rules. The volume discount reduced the com-
missions on orders over 1,000 shares on securities selling
for less than $90 per share and fixed the commissions on a
single order to not exceed $100,000. The impact of this rate
structure was to spread the brokerage business of mutual funds
among a larger number of broker-dealers. However, the same
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pressures noted above still contributed to the brokerage allo-
cation decisions of fund managers. While the practice of
give-ups was curtailed the placing of a transaction order is
still often based on factors other than who can execute the
order the most economically and efficiently for the benefit
of the fund.
Another problem in the area of portfolio transactions
is the broker-affiliated investment company. Close affilia-
tions between a mutual fund and broker-dealers who execute
their portfolio transactions raise questions similar to those
raised concerning the use of brokerage commissions to com-
pensate the dealers for sale of fund shares. Under the broker-
affiliated situation the brokerage which was used as a give-
up now stays with the brokerage firm that is managing the
fund. Again this is a profitable situation for the broker-
dealer., but not always in the best interest of the fund or
its shareholders. One positive viewpoint concerning broker-
affiliated funds is that a small fund is able to benefit from
resources of a sponsoring brokerage firm that the fund might
find beyond their means were they independent. Also, a broker-
affiliated fund benefits from lower transaction rates if,
as often is the case, their brokerage firm-manager is a mem-
ber of the NYSE. This introduces the issue of exchange mem-
bership for institutional investment firms which will be ana-
lyzed below. To summarize the issue of broker-affiliated mutual
funds the situation is not widespread, nor the most important
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regulatory issue of the day, but does present a situation
where the best interests of the fund shareholders could be
easily abused and is a situation possibly requiring regula-
tion.
The subject of institutional investor exchange member-
ship has already been introduced and represents a very current
issue in the area of mutual fund portfolio transactions. Be-
cause of the fixed fee commission rate on the NYSE and with
the curtailment of the give-ups in 1968, the fund managers,
especially of the larger funds, have considered the possibility
of buying seats on the NYSE in order to benefit from the fa-
vorable member trading rates which are considerably lower than
the rates charged nonmembers. While several regional exchanges
have allowed institutional membership, the NYSE and the ASE
have maintained rules prohibiting mutual funds and other pub-
licly held firms from membership. Recently the NYSE amended
its rules to allow publicly held brokerage firms to become
members. Two large mutual funds also applied for membership
and the question was taken under consideration. Currently
there is a detailed study being conducted which will, it is
expected, clarify the exchange's position concerning institu-
tional membership. The potential benefits for a large invest-
ment company are enormous and should the exchange rules be
modified to allow institutional membership it would be in the
best interest of the fund's shareholders. Some powerful mem-
bers of the securities industry are strongly opposed to the
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idea^ and consequently, it may "be some time before this issue
is resolved. Others in the industry feel that negotiated rates
on large block trades is the better alternative. This subject
will be analyzed next.
The subject of negotiated commissions on large stock
trades has very recently been to the forefront of the port-
folio transaction issue. Although the NYSE adopted a volume
discount commission rate schedule late in 1968 , that rate
schedule still retains fixed rates on large transactions.
The mutual funds who are the largest customers in the block
trade market have long opted for some way to reduce the total
commissions on large transactions. As noted earlier, most
broker-dealers were very willing to give-up portions of their
commissions on block trades prior to this practice being pro-
hibited in 1968. Most large firms' were giving up as much as
60 to 70 percent of their commissions because of the profit-
ability of the investment company brokerage business. With
the prohibition of give-ups, the fund managers needed to find
other ways to compensate dealers for fund sales and become
more interested in effecting portfolio trades in the most
economical and efficient way. With exchange membership denied
them, the most logical way to reduce commission costs was by
negotiating rates for large transactions. But the NYSE fixed
rate system prohibited negotiated rates and the brokerage
houses were unreceptive to the idea because they feared the
resultant loss of income. However, the SEC had long held that
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commission rates for large block trading were too high, co
directed the NYSE to shift to negotiated commissions on all
transactions exceeding $500,000. This proposal was contained
in the Institutional Investors Study but had been considered
as far back as the Special Study. The negotiated rate system
went into practice on April 5, 1971 and it is expected to
noticeably reduce the brokerage rates of mutual funds. Many
people in the Industry expect the negotiated rate system to
significantly lower the cost of brokerage for the funds so
that exchange membership will not seem as attractive or de-
sirable, thus removing that thorny issue from the forefront
of concern.
Present regulation of investment company portfolio trans
actions consists primarily of the rules covering exchange
trading along with state regulations and industry self-regu-
latory rules of the NASD and the Investment Company Institute.
Existing regulations proved ineffective in preventing the de-
velopment and abuses of the reciprocity and give-up practice.
While the give-up prohibition of 1969 has for the most part
eliminated that situation many factors still exist that tempt
investment company managers to use brokerage for purposes
other than in the best Interests of the shareholders. It is
Actually the standard commission rate applies on the
first $500,000 of any transaction with the commission rate on
all of the transaction exceeding $500,000 subject to nego-
tiation between the customer and the broker. If the system
works as planned, it is expected that the SEC will lower the
$500,000 figure sometime in the future.
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easily understood why fund managers are reluctant to volun-
tarily abandon or refrain from engaging in practices that
favor accelerated sales of fund shares or to withstand pres-
sures for churning of the fund portfolio. A larger fund
means greater management fees, and greater portfolio turnover
generates more brokerage commissions, both measures of suc-
cess for the management company if the loyalty of the manager
is directed toward the profitability of the management com-
pany at the expense of serving the best interests of the fund
shareholders. The SEC is attempting to correct the problems
in the area of portfolio transactions by changing exchange
trading rules and has not requested additional legislation.
Because of the nature of the problems involved with this issue,
the SEC approach is probably the best alternative. The speed
at which the SEC has proceeded in this matter leaves much to
be desired, but their approach is basically sound. Adequate
legislation exists for the control of exchange operations and
trading practices. The securities industry has repeatedly
expressed the willingness to exercise additional self-regula-
tion to avoid additional legislative regulation. It remains
for the industry to adequately self-regulate itself and the
SEC to adequately and effectively protect investment company
shareholders from the abuses and unfavorable actions of the




Distribution and Its Cost
The sales of new fund shares on a continuing basis has
accounted for a large segment of the growth of the mutual fund
industry. The relatively low price per share, the promise of
professional management, and the ready availability and ease
of purchase of mutual fund shares made available to the small
investor, often for the first time, an opportunity to parti-
cipate in the stock market. Some new sales are necessary to
offset redemptions; however, the sale of new shares far ex-
ceeds the redemption rate as evidenced by the growth of the
industry during the past twenty years. The cost of the dis-
tribution of these nev; shares is the issue for analysis here.
The distribution of a fund's shares is accomplished
through an underwriter, often a wholly-owned subsidiary or
closely associated group of the management advisory company.
The underwriter sells the shares to a dealer who in turn,
through salesmen, sells the shares to the individual inves-
tor. The cost of this operation is offset by assessing the
customer a sales charge for each share similar to the per
share commission associated with a security transaction ac-
complished by a broker. This charge, known as a "sales load,"
is the difference between the current net asset value per
share received by the fund and the public offering price paid
by the investor. This basic load typically amounts to 8.5




percent of the offering price per share and is by far the most
significant charge paid by mutual fund investors. It is the
level of the sales load that is the major subject of this dis-
cussion.
A second major problem in the area of distribution and
its cost is the area of front- end load contractual plans. A
contractual plan is one which allows the planholder to accumu-
late shares of a mutual fund on an installment basis. A sales
load of up to 50 percent is deducted from the first year's
payments and is known as the "front-end load." A typical con-
tractual plan calls for investing $3000 by making $25 payments
monthly for 10 years. The total sales load on the complete
plan cannot exceed 9 percent; thus, with 50 percent coming out
the first year, subsequent years are reduced. The front-end
load feature of contractual plans results in about six times
the sales compensation for the first year as compared to the
sales load on a voluntary or lump sum investment in the same
mutual fund. This high sales charge works to the disadvan-
tage of the planholder j vail result in the planholder always
having less percentage of his investment working for him, and
is particularly disadvantageous to those who redeem or stop
making payments before completing their plans. Front-end load
'It should be noted that some funds, known as no-load
funds, do not charge sales loads of the magnitude indicated
here, therefore, the discussion herein is directed not at them,
but at that majority segment of the industry which does charge
sales loads because there is where the problem exists.
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plans are popular with securities sales personnel and some-
times result in high pressure selling practices. Studies show
that most contractual plans are not completed on schedule. *
All factors considered, the best interests of the investor
can never be served by purchasing a front-end load contractual
plan. Front-end load contractual plans represent the second
problem to be discussed concerning the issue of distribution
and its cost.
Sales load levels, as noted above, usually represent 8.5
percent of the offering price per share. Sales loads are re-
duced for large purchases, but those reductions benefit rela-
tively few investors because they are seldom available for
purchases of less than $10,000 and many do not apply to pur-
chases of less than $25,000. The sales load pays for selling
effort only. The underwriter usually retains from 0.5 percent
to 2.5 percent of the offering price, the medium being 2 per-
cent, with the balance of the load going to the dealer. The
typical dealer-salesman split is 50-50. The average sales
load on mutual fund transactions is significantly greater
than the round trip sales charges on individual securities
2purchased and sold through a broker on a major exchange.
3They are also higher than CTC sales charges. For example,
1Public Policy Report, p. 22.
2 Ibid
., pp. 20, 210,
5
Ibid., pp. 20, 212.
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a round lot transaction of a $40 stock v/ould result in the
following commission charge: $4000 times a commission rate
of 1 percent equals $40, plus a surcharge of $15 making a total
brokerage charge of $55 for execution of the order. In order
to properly equate these charges to those charged mutual fund
investors one must consider the total round trip cost because
mutual fund shareholders pay only one sales charge, at time
of purchase, and do not pay an additional charge for redeem-
ing fund shares. Therefore, the total cost of executing a
round trip transaction in the above example would equal $110.
This round trip cost is compared to the $340 load charged the
mutual fund purchaser on a $4000 investment in a fund charging
the normal 8.5 percent load. This round trip sales load for
a $4000 transaction is 210 percent greater for the typical
mutual fund investor than the cost of a similar transaction
of a listed security traded througi the services of a broker.
Mutual fund sales loads' are even higher than the spreads under-
writers receive in connection with most underwriter distribu-
tions of non-fund securities where, unlike mutual fund under-
writers, they assume the risk and make special distribution
efforts. In addition, many funds charge shareholders a sales
load on shares purchased with dividend income. Many share-
holders use the dividends and capital gains distributed by the
fund to acquire additional shares through automatic reinvest—
ilbid., pp. 20, 212-214.
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merit plans. While a sales load is not charged on reinvestment
of capital gain distributions, a substantial minority of funds
impose standard sales loads on the reinvestment of ordinary-
dividends. Sales loads on invested dividends are not related
in any way to any special selling effort apart from that in-
volved in the initial sale and are completely unjustified.
Present regulation of sales load levels is limited to
the requirement for sales loads to be disclosed in the fund
prospectus. Except for contractual plans, no expressed sta-
tutory limits are placed on sales loads although the SEC and
the NASD are given rule making authority to prevent "uncon-
scionable or grossly excessive" sales loads. At the time of
the passage of the 1S40 Investment Company Act it was hoped
that competition would keep sales loads down. This has not
proved to be the case. In fact, the framework of Section
22(d) of the Act, the so-called price maintenance provision
prohibiting dealers from selling a redeemable investment se-
curity to the public except at a current offering price des-
cribed in the prospectus, has suppressed any downward pressures
that normal market forces might otherwise exert on sales load
levels. Senator Mclntyre at one time introduced a bill call-
ing for, among other things, the repeal of this price main-
tenance provision in an attempt to pave the way for lower
sales loads, but the provision was not retained in the final
Senate bill as passed. " The Wharton Report warned of a pos~
1See Chapter III, supra.
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sible conflict of interest situation between shareholders and
management in the selling of fund shares. The Public Policy
Report while noting that some disparity between mutual fund
sales loads and the cost of investing in listed securities
may be warranted considered the existing disparity unjusti-
fied. It recommended to Congress that a 5 percent ceiling
be placed on mutual fund sales charges as well as prohibiting
anomalous and inequitable sales charges such as loads now
imposed on the reinvestment of dividends. Considerable op-
position was expressed on the part of the industry based
on the fear that a reduction in the sales load would result
in reduced sales efforts, therefore, less growth in number
of shares sold and a consequent reduction or leveling off
of revenues flowing into the management advisors. The final
resolution of this discussion as evidenced by the Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970 provided for the industry to
regulate itself on the .matter of sales charges. The NASD
is directed to study the situation and establish policy re-
garding the general level of sales charges. While the NASD
has not yet had time to complete any study since the enact-
ment of the law, there exist grave doubts concerning any low-
ering of sales charges to result from this action. It is in-
teresting to note that neither of the two most recent studies
Wharton Report, p. 29.
^ Pub 1 1 c Po 1 1 c ; port, p . 21.
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In the field of investment company regulation, the Twentieth
Century 'Fund Study and the Institutional Investor Study 3 ad-
dressed the question of the cost of distribution.
The matter of front- end load contractual plans has
faired better from the standpoint of investor interests as
a result of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970.
Historically the sales load from the scheduled first year's
payments on a contractual plan have been about 50 percent or
six times the sales compensation on the same amount invested
In the same fund by a lump sum or voluntary plan where the
standard sales load of 6.5 percent would apply. This high
sales load works to the disadvantage of all contractual plan-
holders including those who complete their plans on schedule
because they always have a smaller proportion of their pay-
ments worlting for them than if a level sales load had been
deducted from each payment. The front-end load is especially
disadvantageous to those who redeem before completing their
payments or those who simply stop making payments because
they have paid effective sales loads which are many times
the normal sales load on the number of shares their investment
actually represents. Because of the lucrative commission-
structure, the front-end contractual plan has proven very
popular with mutual fund salesmen., so popular in fact that
the incentives have been responsible for undesirable high
pressure selling practices. The argument that front-end load
contractual plans are an effective stimulus to systematic
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investment has "been reduced "by the plan sponsors' own statis-
tics which show that most contractual plans are not com-
pleted on schedule. Because of the basic impacts of the
front- end load, the Public Policy Report recommended their
future sales be prohibited. The Congress was reluctant to
enact a measure this drastic, however,, did pass measures that
greatly enhance the position of the individual investor in a
contractual plan. The 1970 Investment Company Amendments Act
provides that front-end loaded contractual plans must refund
85 percent of its sales charges if an investor abandoned the
plan within 18 months. Further, front-end load plans cannot
impose more than 64 percent of their sales charges during the
first four years, or more than 20 percent during any one year.
These meas ares will tend to level out the sales load on con-
tractual plans as well as insure the investor recovery of 85
percent of his sales load as well as his shares should they
be liquidated within 18 months. While this provision of the
law is not popular with those industry representatives con-
nected with the front-end load plan, it certainly is a welcome
step toward the type of regulation necessary to provide the
investor the type of protection he can reasonably expect.
The adequacy and effectiveness of regulatory statutes
applying to the issue of mutual fund share distribution and
A study conducted in 1962 by the Securities Research
Unit of the Wh? rton School of Finance and Commerce of the




Its cost before the passage of the Investment Company Amend-
ment Act of 1970 was clearly questionable. Sales loads have
remained significantly above the round trip cost of trading
listed securities and front-end loaded contractual plans were
unfairly administered from the 'viewpoint of investor inter-
ests. The need for action was apparent. The SEC recommenda-
tions of a 5 percent limit on sales loads and the abolishment
of front-end load contractual plans were in the best interests
of the investing public. These measures were bitterly opposed
by the investment company industry, and with sufficient rea-
son from their point of view. The level of interest on the
part of the mutual fund management groups in protecting the
interests of their shareholders as compared to their own fi-
nancial interests has never been very high and in this case,
the management representatives were attempting to protect their
own sources of revenue at the expense and against the best
interests of the fund shareholders. The resulting Congres-
sional action represents a compromise that will have to be
given a test of time before its effectiveness and adequacy
will be known. Self-regulation in the case of sales load
levels could work if enough pressure to make it work is forth-
coming from the SEC. The securities industry has a generally
respectable record of self-regulation when they have been
forced to self-regulate or accept additional statute regula-
tion. The new measures relating to front- end load contractual
plans should improve the situation materially, reduce the sales
effort directed at front end load plans, and hopefully help
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educate the public as to the folly of "buying that type of in-
vestment plan. Should the mutual fund industry fail to effect
some type of self-regulation that results in some lowering of
the sales load level, legislative action fixing an upper level
equitable to both the industry. and the investor would seem to
best serve the interests of the investor. The best interests
of the investing public concerning front-end loaded contrac-
tual plans are best dealt with as the Public Policy Report
recommended--abolishment.
Relationships with Portfolio Companies
The relationship between an investment company and its
portfolio companies has been an issue of concern since the
passage of the 1940 Investment Company Act. In fact, the 1940
Act expresses concern over investment company impact "on con-
centration of control of wealth and industry and on companies
in which investment companies are interested." With the rapid
and expansive growth of investment companies during the inter-
vening years the concern has lingered. Of the Issues analyzed
in this research effort this matter of relationship with port-
folio companies seems to warrant the least concern from the
standpoint of shareholder protection.
The basic problems involved in the issue is the concern
by Congress and others that investment company managements
could gain substantial or even dominant positions in other en-
terprises by investing the fund's assets in the securities of
that enterprise. The result could be the exercise of manage-
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ment for purposes other than the best Interests of the share-
holders although the opposite could also result. Studies
show that no misuse of power in this regard can "be documented
to date. The mutual funds have done a good job of self-regu-
lation in this area. The Wharton Report found that mutual
fund managers participated in portfolio company affairs only
in limited ways and concluded that mutual fund influences on
portfolio companies did not warrant serious concern. The
Public Policy Report
.,
based on the data in the Wharton Report,
suggested that there was no present need for new legislation
on investment company--portfollo relationships. However,
mutual funds are much larger today than they were during the
period of these reports. The Institution a.l Investor Study ex-
amined this issue in some detail and concluded the following:
a) Investment companies and other institutional investors
have the potential economic power to influence many
companies, particularly large companies, because of
their stock holdings. In fact, the concentration of
holdings is pronounced in some of the larger companies.
b) Some institutions have personal and business relation-
ships with portfolio companies. These relationships
tend to promote conflict of interest situations, how-
ever, there is little or no evidence indicating mutual
fund management has engaged in this practice.
c) Institutions do not generally' involve themselves di-
rectly in corporate decision making. The general prac-
tice is liquidation of holdings where corporate policies
and proposals appear inappropriate. Investment man-
agers generally vote in favor of portfolio company
1Wharton Report, pp. 424-427.
)lic Policy Report, p. 20.
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management proposals or refrain from participation
completely.
d) Some institutions have been actively and significantly
involved in facilitating contested transfers of cor-
porate control . 3.
It is the last conclusion that generated the recommendation
of the study concerning corporate takeover and the change in
the disclosure rules requiring institutions to report all
holdings in companies that exceed 5 percent as compared to
the present 10 percent.
Present regulation in the field of relationships with
portfolio companies is relatively sparse as compared to the
other issues discussed herein. The provision for reporting
holdings in portfolio companies over 10 percent mentioned atove
along with general trading and disclosure rules represent the
total existing regulation concerning the issue. From the
findings of the Wharton Report in 1960, to those of the Insti-
tutional Investor Study of 1970, the problems in the area seem
minimal. Self-regulation seems to have "been effective in this
situation and the rather meager federal regulation would ap-
pear to have "been both adequate and effective from a share-
holder viewpoint. Unless significant developments occur in
the matter of investment company relationships with portfolio
companies, no apparent need is evident that would require any
1 Institutional Investor Study, p. 127.
-See Institu
Chapter III, supra."
c tional Investor Study Report Summary in
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further action on the part of the government. The problems
of shareholder relations with mutual fund managements appears
much more in need of attention than does the area of invest-




This research project has analyzed the problems asso-
ciated with regulation of mutual fund management companies.
Ancillary to the basic question under examination has been
identification of the problems, a review of past research, and
examination of the existing regulatory pattern. In summariz-
ing the research conducted in connection with this effort,
three subjects surface. First, have the research questions
posed in Chapter I been answered? Second, what conclusions
can be drawn from the research findings? Third, what areas
appear as candidates for further study? The purpose of this
Chapter is to provide answers to these three questions as they
pertain to the subject of regulation of mutual fund management
companies.
The basic research question of this study was, "is pres-
ent Federal regulation of mutual fund management companies ade-
quate for investor protection?" The answer is no. On balance,
the mutual fund industry is well regulated and provides the
mutual fund Investor a large measure of protection from gross ...
mismanagement on the part of fund management advisors. How-
ever, there are certain problem areas where conflict of inter-
est situations between shareholders and management have de-




sures in order to insure the shareholder the degree of pro-
tection he should logically expect. These areas are: (l)
management and its cost; (2) portfolio transactions and the
allocation, of fund "brokerage; and (3) distribution of fund
shares and the associated costs.
Five subsidiary research questions were proposed along
with the basic question. These subsidiary questions con-
cerned: (l) the history of investment company regulation;
(2) identification of the issues of mutual fund regulation;
(3) the effectiveness of existing regulation; (4) the adequacy
of investor protection provided by existing regulation; and.,
(5) the need for additional regulation. Have these questions
been answered in this research report? It is suggested tha - ;
the history of open-ended investment company regulation is
adequately described in Chapter II. Likewise, the question
of issue identification is the content of Chapter III, whers
identification of investment company regulatory issues was
accomplished through the technique of reviewing research ef-
forts conducted over the past ten years. The related questions
of regulation effectiveness and the adequacy of investor pro-
tection provided by existing regulatory legislation are dis-
cussed in Chapter IV as they apply to the particular issues
being analyzed. The final subsidiary question concerning the
.
need for additional regulation will be addressed In the af-
firmative later In this Chapter. With the discussion on addi-
tional r<
'
ation contained in Chapter V, it is submitted that
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all the subsidiary questions, along with the primary research
question, have "been answered.
Summary
The passage of the Investment Company Act of 194-0 pro-
vided significant protection to investors who placed their in-
vestment monies with mutual funds. The investment compa,ny
industry is the most thoroughly regulated segment of the se-
curities industry. However, mutual funds have experienced
rapid growth since 1940, greater by far than any of the other
financial intermediaries, and this growth has created regula-
tory problems not fully envisioned either during the develop-
ment of the vast body of securities industry regulation sta-
tutes or at the inception of the 1940 legislation. Five major
studies relating to investment company regulations have oc-
curred within the past ten years. The same set of issu.es de-
veloped in the first two of these studies prevail as the major
issues of concern today with regard to investment company
regulation. While mutual funds allow modest investors to own
a share of American capitalism evidence indicates they are
overpaying for it via excessive sales charges. Further, the
investor's cost is not limited to sales loads because most
funds pay additional management or advisory fees to an outside
advisor for investment advice and management services. These
management fees are generally higher than those charged other
investment clients and they often become excessive as the fund
grows while the fee remains fixed at a flat rate. Serious
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conflict cf interest situations between shareholders and man-
agement also have surfaced in the area of portfolio trans-
actions and the allocation of brokerage. Less serious problems
exist in the area of relationships with portfolio companies.
Recent legislation, the first major amendments to the 1940
Investment Company Act since its passage, was a compromise
between that recommended by the SEC and that acceptable to the
industry with the probable effect of being too mild to accom-
plish the desired results of providing adequate investor pro-
tection.
The following specific points are summarized from the
data contained in previous chapters and related to the mutual
fund industry and its regulation:
1. Industry growth : The mutual fund industry has ex-
perienced large growth during the past thirty years in asset
value, number of shareholders, and number of new funds.
2. Regulatory legislation : Following the depression
years, there developed a vast body of securities industry regu-
lation at the Federal level. This body of regulation has, on
balance, proved effective.
3. Investment Company Act of 191-0 : This statute regu-
lating the investment company industry is the mos'j detailed and
thorough component of the Federal body of securities regula-
tion. The 1940 Act has provided significant protection to the
investing public whose funds are in mutual funds, but did not
adequately deal with certain of the problems which developed
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as a result of the vast growth of the industry.
-* Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970: This
Act corrects many inequities, but several provisions are cause
for investor concern. While a reasonable time should be
granted for observation before a final evaluation, it seems
questionable that self-regulation in the case of sales loads
and the difficult burden of proof requirement connected with
the management fees question will result in lower sales loads
or management fees. The front-end load contractual plan may
die a natural death from lack of salesforce interest, but if
that fails to occur, the plans should be abolished.
Conclusions
The following conclusions pre drawn concerning the major
issues of mutual fund regulation:
1. Management and its cost: Management fees paid by
mutual funds to their investment advisors should be reduced
to a level comparable to other forms of investment management.
No adequate explanation is evident to explain the significant
disparity between fees paid by other investment organizations
for investment management and the much higher rates paid by
mutual funds for like services on portfolios of comparable
size. Adoption of a reducing scale management fee rate based '*'
on size of portfolio with incentives, both of the reward and
penalty type, based on management's performance in accomplish-
ing the fund's investment objective is recommended as the
optimum solution to the issue of the cost of management. The
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provisions of the Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970
have not yet been given a reasonable trial of time, but it
seems doubtful that their mild nature will result in moving
management advisors toward returning any significant measure
of the economies of size to the shareholders. Voluntarily
reducing the income flow is not normal practice in any busi-
ness and probably could not reasonably be expected of mutual
fund management advisors. Therefore, it is suggested that
additional legislation will be required to force adjustment
in the area of management costs in the mutual fund industry.
2. Portfolio Transactions: Allocation of the broker-
age generated by fund portfolio transactions in a fashion that
is most beneficial to the fund and its shareholders should be
a legal requirement of fund management. Present regulation
allows practices to occur that mitigate against the best in-
terests of the shareholders, but accure to the profit motives
of the investment advisor. An example is when the brokerage
allocation decision is motivated by a desire on the part of
the fund manager to rei\Tard a firm for sales of fund shares
rather than being based on who can execute the transaction
most economically and efficiently. A legal requirement bind-
ing the fund advisor to place the best interests of the fund
and its shareholders foremost in decisions regarding brokerage
allocation would largely reduce the temptations which present-
ly cause fund managers to act otherwise. This area is a per-
fect situation for industry self-regulation, but as was the case
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with regards to management fee reduction the magnitude of the
revenues involved make self-regulation an unlikely solution.
The effect of the new negotiated commission rate system which
began operating in April., 1971 on the issue of portfolio
transactions cannot yet be properly evaluated. Exchange mem-
bership for the funds, should such membership be authorized,
would be in the best interests of the funds and their share-
holders. Exchange membership may prove practical for only
the largest investment companies, however, due to the cost
of exchange seats. The lower member trading ra.tes would un-
doubtedly reduce the cost of brokerage transactions for the
funds who were members. Whether or not the savings in broker-
age costs, resulting from becoming members of the major ex-
changes would be significantly lower than the brokerage costs
experienced under the new negotiated rate system is a question
yet to be answered.
3. Distribution and its cost: The sales loads charged
investors in mutual funds should be reduced to a level more
in line with the cost of round trip trades of listed secur-
ities. The sales load charged mutual fund purchasers, typi-
cally 8.5 percent, is significantly greater than the round
trip sales charges on individual securities traded through
a broker on a major exchange, are higher than OTC sales charges,
and are even higher than the spreads received by underwriters
in the distribution of non-fund securities. The sales load
charged mutual fund investors pays for selling effort only.
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It does not benefit the shareholders, but does benefit the
underwriters and distributors of the fund shares. While
some disparity between mutual fund sales loads and the cost
of other types of security transactions may be warranted, the
existing disparity is not justified. Having concluded like-
wise Congress in the Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970
enacted provisions for the mutual fund industry to regulate
itself on the matter of sales charges. The NASD is presently
conducting a detailed study of the matter and is charged
with establishing policy with regard to the general level of
sales charges. While this approach should be given every
chance to succeed it remains doubtful that lower sales charges
will result from voluntary action. Fears on the part of mutual
fund managers that any lowering of sales charges will result
in reduced sales effort with the consequent reduction or
leveling off of management fee revenues flowing into the man-
agement advisors are likely to override other considerations.
Any reduction in mutual fund sales loads that moves the charges
more in line with the cost of executing other types of security
transactions will probably require legislation of a stronger
nature than that contained in the 1970 Amendment Act.
4. Relationships with Portfolio Companies: This issue
has been of concern to Congress and the SEC since the incep-
tion of the 1940 Act. The issue seems to attract more atten-
tion and concern than It warrants. Evidence to date has not
indicated any serious regulatory problems exist in the area of
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investment company relationships with the management and poli-
cies of portfolio companies. The common practice is for in-
vestment companies to liquidate their positions in any port-
folio companies where management policy became questionable
.
Unless additional data is presented which indicates action is
desirable there appears no need for regulatory action in this
area.
5. Conflict of Interest Situations: There are several
areas where potential conflict of interest situations exist
between the fund shareholders and the fund management advisor.
In addition to those areas discussed herein there are also
issues of excessive portfolio turnover, compensation of un-
affiliated management personnel, insider trading, and a whole
plethora of issues regarding performance. The complete sub-
ject of shareholder-management relationships needs extensive
review, examination, and analysis.
The answer to the final subsidiary question becomes
apparent from the conclusions above. Additional regulation
is needed in the areas of management and its cost, portfolio
transactions, and the distribution area and its cost. Addi-
tional regulation applying to the groups who manage mutual
funds is required in order to provide adequate and effective
protection to the shareholders against gross mismanagement.
As is common with any research project, areas are touched
upon that warrant additional study. Such is the case here.
The final conclusion discussed above reflects the problem of
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conflicts of interest between shareholders and management
groups. A complete study is needed in the area with a view
toward recommending legislation that would clarify the re-
sponsibilities of each party as well as guarantee the share-
holders adequate protection from misuse of authority by manage-
ment. A second and related area which deserves additional
study is the desirability of legislating rules of conduct
that apply to institutional investment managers which specify
that their primary responsibility is to the best interests of
their investment clients., shareholders in the case of mutual
fund s , and not to their own management or advisory organiza-
tion. This type of regulatory measure, coupled with severe
penalties for noncompliance, would help eliminate the develop-
ment of the various interest conflicts discussed earlier.
A final thought on the subject of investment company
regulation. The mutual fund industry, while not perfect, is
basically well regulated and well managed by competent and
conscientious individuals. The industry can become even more
respected by the effective contribution of governmental regu-
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